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Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial 
Malaya
Donna J. Amoroso
Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre; 
Singapore: NUS Press, 2014, 276p.
The recently concluded November 2014 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) General 
Assembly saw strident calls for other Malaysian communities to respect and honor the superior 
position of Malays and Islam in the country; for the unity of all Malays under UMNO, as their 
representative and protector; and for stronger safeguards to prevent slurs against Malaysia’s 
revered sultans.  From the cheers (or virtual sighs of resignation) with which the press and public 
met these appeals, one might think such discourse had always been the norm in Malaysia.  Yet as 
Donna Amoroso’s insightful study reveals, in fact, no part of the order UMNO leaders invoke is 
inevitable or even all that deep-rooted.  Rather, the position of the sultans, the multiracial balance 
of population and power, and the relative prominence of UMNO itself reflect colonial patterns and 
anticolonial struggles more than age-old attributes of a unified Malay public.
Published, sadly, only posthumously, Amoroso’s convincing and readable Traditionalism and 
the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial Malaya takes us back to the early days of 
British colonialism, locating the roots of Malaysia’s fundamentally conservative political order in 
patterns of indirect rule.  Amoroso details the British elevation of what she terms “traditionalism,” 
or “the conscious selection of appropriate ritual and idiom and the reconstruction of Malay culture 
along lines that were compatible with colonial rule” (p. 52).  Traditionalism involved, on the one 
hand, the selective restoration of Malay culture and on the other, the creation of new norms and 
structures, to facilitate far-reaching changes.  The result was both legitimation of British power 
and the aggrandizement of the Malay ruling class.  Reified in the first key political transition, from 
Malay to British rule, then reaffirmed, with some adjustments, as colonial rule gave way to self-rule 
after World War II, the dominance of the Malay rulers over a presumed-feudalistic Malay populace 
has become iconic as a trope of Malay politics.
Amoroso begins where the conventional wisdom tends to assume the story starts: with depic-
tions of Malays as “backwards” and “feudal,” needing and expecting, as former Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad declared in his path-forging The Malay Dilemma, special assistance and pater-
nalistic leaders.  Such a formulation was as useful for Mahathir as it was for the British before 
him—and just as much a construction.  Aiming both to disguise the extent of their intervention 
and to stabilize Malay society, while also economizing by working through preexisting structures, 
the British propped up a set of Malay rulers as heads of homogenized, territorially-fixed Malay 
states.  The rulers enjoyed pomp and regular payments; the British gained the appearance of 
ruling with, rather than just through, these figures of “traditional” local authority as they con-
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solidated their control through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  A stratum of aristo-
cratic “chiefs,” meanwhile, served to link the British with the people, enabling the former to gauge 
popular reactions to reforms proposed, as well as to ensure some level of continuity in local 
administration.
British ideas about the nature and function of government—in particular, norms of “good 
government,” defined largely in terms of opening the state to, and developing the legal and phys-
ical infrastructure to support, capitalism—concatenated with their concern for the “traditional,” 
including an orientalist vision of exotic rites and a conveniently deferential mass public.  That 
pairing required a fairly uniform set of states, with a fairly standardized, mutually exclusive author-
ity structure, premised on control of demarcated territory rather than just of manpower.  Yet the 
colonial authorities’ aim was economic, political, and demographic transformation, extending to the 
importation of thousands of laborers from China and India, while preserving a Malay society that 
was “overwhelmingly rural, politically docile and deferential to traditional aristocracies and royal-
ties” (p. 4).  This pattern of indirect rule rendered the British the apparent guardian of Malay 
interests, not least against increasing numbers of resident non-Malay workers—despite the fact 
that the British were largely responsible for the presence of those others within Malay lands.
As independence came to seem imminent, both the rulers and the class of aristocratic admin-
istrators needed to take over that mantle of protector.  Malay elites’ complicity with Japanese 
occupying forces during World War II left the British dubious of their reliability; however, the 
latter’s Malayan Union plan for self-government would grant liberal citizenship to the non-Malays 
who had been their wartime allies and essentially strip the Malay rulers of their authority.  While 
the story of UMNO’s founding in the crucible of opposition to the Malayan Union is part of party 
lore,  Amoroso’s detailing of the specific machinations of the rulers and the aristocracy—allied for 
strategic purposes, but differently positioned—and the ways in which the late colonial era shaped 
their conservatism sheds new light on a foundational period in Malaysian history.
This process of entrenchment and preservation of a fixed set of largely compliant rulers, 
undergirded by what Chandra Muzaffar has labeled “administocrats” (civil servants in the colonial 
government, turned founders and leading lights of UMNO) served to equate bangsa (ethnic group) 
with kebangsaan (nationalism): these elites self-servingly framed survival of the Malays in their 
own land as intertwined with the identity and supremacy of the Malay ruling class.  The British 
kept the Malay masses poorly educated, apart from an elite stratum educated in English starting 
early in the twentieth century at the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), just enough to 
serve as the lowest (yet still socially prestigious) echelon of government.  This layer complemented 
that of the rulers at the top, without being equipped to pose a challenge to the British district 
officers in the middle.  Malay rulers deemed ill-suited to the new order, the British bought off with 
pensions; others, while still regarded as inferior in character and capacity to their British overlords, 
received a regular allowance that “recognised a recipient’s position in society and guaranteed his 
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correct behaviour in political life,” thus serving “to foster active cooperation with British rule” 
(p. 42).  In other words, the Malay ruling class lost real power with the advent of a colonial order, 
but gained status, wealth, and stability, celebrated through ceremonies and symbols.  Meanwhile, 
the rulers’ perhaps unwitting role as “frontmen” for the colonial state (p. 97) effectively thwarted 
criticism of the British.
Even so, by the 1920s–30s, rising Malay literacy and a burgeoning press, urbanization and 
interaction across ethnic lines, increasingly active associational life, ties with counterparts in Indo-
nesia and elsewhere, the disruption and dislocation of economic changes, and especially the Japa-
nese interregnum threatened that balance.  The very sense of the “Malay state” and “Malay 
people” crystallized during that late colonial period, in part through British action, and in part 
through the contest between UMNO and its more radical adversaries, especially in the Partai 
Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM, Malay Nationalist Party of Malaya).  Critical voices argued 
that the rulers should be less self-absorbed and docile, and should instead play a more active role 
in advancing Malay educational and economic progress, as well as working toward independence. 
Not least given British proscriptions, overtly “political” interventions were slow to develop prewar; 
part of the signal importance of the wartime occupation was the Japanese’s freeing and even train-
ing of nationalist interests.  While the British Military Administration that followed restored key 
aspects of the status quo ante, the British failure to protect the Malays during the war, and of 
the Malay rulers, to do so after (amidst ethnic violence, communist insurgency, and unfavorable 
 British schemes) lent grist to serious challenges, even as international norms and local plans left 
the British limited space for censorship or outright repression.
Ultimately, though, UMNO and the rulers together won out, with their assertion that bangsa 
Melayu required preservation of “tradition.”  Conservatives propagated this message through a 
new style of mass politics, borrowed from the left and radical nationalists, and performed in media, 
rallies, speeches, and symbols.  Maintenance of the ruling class trumped a more anticolonial nation-
alist response, as the “political struggle against the Malayan Union had transformed the Malay 
rulers into symbols of the new nation” (p. 164)—and peninsular Malaya into a unified nation, rather 
than a network of single states—no matter the rulers’ own initial complicity, in signing treaties 
with the British (later foresworn) to enable the Malayan Union’s enactment.
Amoroso’s account is well-supported and plausible.  Still, the historical record leaves stronger 
evidence of British aspirations and actions than of their erstwhile subjects’ reasoning.  She relies 
largely on British colonial sources and archives, albeit including letters form Malay rulers, reported 
conversations with the latter, and interviews.  However, most evidence comes through the lens 
of “Anglo-Malay encounters” (p. 18), and as perceived or retold by the Anglo side of that conversa-
tion.  The Malay masses here are largely mute followers—apart from a surge of mass political 
participation in the 1940s–50s, when they still acted seemingly en bloc.  Furthermore, for the most 
part, Amoroso can only read the Malay rulers’ own reasoning from their actions or British reports 
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of the same.  The account would be more convincing still were she able to include more first-hand 
discussions, at least from the rulers or aristocracy themselves.  As it stands, the closest her retell-
ing comes to such a perspective is probably in her discussion of early nationalist periodicals, UMNO 
proceedings, and more radical nationalist statements.  I suspect the fault lies more in what sources 
are available than in Amoroso’s sleuthing.
The publication of this long-awaited book—adapted from Amoroso’s doctoral dissertation at 
Cornell University—contributes to our knowledge of Malay political and social history, and at a 
time when discussion of the Malay rulers and their stature is especially keen (notwithstanding how 
out-of-sync lèse-majesté laws would be with Malay history, as detailed here).  More broadly, the 
work serves to illuminate the actual workings of indirect rule: how and why colonial authorities 
worked with, and altered, extant structures and patterns of authority, and the implications of those 
adaptations for anticolonial struggles and postcolonial development.  As such, the work will be of 
interest to scholars not just of Malaysia, but of British and other European colonial projects more 
broadly—and it is written in such a way as to be accessible and useful to both a specialist and 
interested non-specialist audience.  With this volume, Donna Amoroso adds to her already consid-
erable academic legacy—including, of course, the Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, which she was 
instrumental in founding.
Meredith L. Weiss
University at Albany, State University of New York
Living with Risk: Precarity and Bangkok’s Urban Poor
Tamaki Endo
Singapore: NUS Press in association with Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2014, 360p.
Given the paucity of books and articles written about the day-to-day living of the poor and the 
informal economy in Bangkok, this book is a welcome addition.  It offers readers a solid understand-
ing of the contemporary urban lower class, revealing the homogeneity and stratification within this 
class.  In particular, it investigates their daily survival strategies and responses to various risks, 
focusing on issues related to residence and occupation.  It also examines whether upward mobility 
occurs within this group and what upward mobility means for members of this group.
The structure of the book makes it obvious that this book is Endo’s doctoral thesis.  Conse-
quently, the first chapter is her literature review.  She discusses various useful topics related to 
the urban lower class, including the informal economy debate, frameworks to capture the internal 
structure of cities, the risk response processes of the urban lower class, the place and organization 
units of their strategy for survival, and the life course analysis method.  While these topics them-
